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LOUD TALK ABOUT A QUIET ISSUE: THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY'S STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INFORMATION GAINED IN NUCLEAR FACILITY INSPECTIONS
Alison Van Lear*
How concerned today are average citizens about nuclear destruction?
Many would say that with the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the
Soviet Union, nuclear war is no longer a paramount concern. However, with
these world changes also comes instability. Many smaller and newly
independent nations find themselves jostling for a piece of the power
abandoned by the former Soviet Union, and the key to obtaining this power is
the acquisition of nuclear weapons. "[F]ears about the spread of weapons of
mass destruction-nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles
to deliver them-have, if anything, intensified."' Some small nations, such as
Iraq, are even dangerously close to actually becoming nuclear powers.
In this world, the roles of international organizations such as the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or "the Agency") and the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) have become critical in balancing power
struggles and ensuring that newly independent countries do not develop
nuclear weapon-making capacities. Unfortunately, these international
organizations are themselves facing serious internal crises. Allegations of
espionage that threaten to undermine their ability to maintain confidentiality
of information have been leveled. The ability of these agencies to ensure full
support and compliance with their policies depends upon countries' confidence
in their major tool, nuclear facility inspection capabilities. The IAEA and
UNSCOM must be able to assure others that information gained in nuclear
facility inspections will remain confidential. Unfortunately, the espionage
claims show that "confidentiality" has become a major problem.
This Note will focus on the problems faced by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, both historically and currently. It will address political and
judicial measures available to the Agency to deter unauthorized disclosures of
confidential materials gained in nuclear facility inspections.
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I. HISTORY SETS THE STAGE FOR CURRENT CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES
A. The Birth of Atomic Energy Regulation
Throughout the development of an international nuclear non-proliferation
framework, confidentiality and secrecy have remained at the political
forefront. This is largely due to the dual nature of nuclear materials:
dissemination of information regarding nuclear materials as a source of energy
has been tempered by the reality that "peaceful nuclear programs can provide
a means of acquiring the necessary fissile material for nuclear explosives. ' 2
The development of a non-proliferation regime can be divided into three
stages. The first stage was initiated after the end of World War II and was
described as a period of "secrecy. '3 The second stage commenced when the
Soviet Union began testing and exploding nuclear devices in the early 1950s.
4
This stage was characterized by international cooperation and dissemination
of information on the peaceful use of nuclear materials.' The final stage began
in the mid 1970s and is marked by an effort to restore confidence in a
controlled nuclear regime.6 Stages one and two were essential to the creation
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its current safeguards
program.
During the initial "period of secrecy" in the aftermath of the Second World
War, the three nations which had cooperated to discover atomic energy
promulgated efforts to control the dissemination of information on the
subject. 7 The Trilateral Agreed Declaration was signed on November 14,
1945, by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada.' This agreement
expressed the countries' willingness to make available to the international
community the scientific information necessary for the production of atomic
energy. 9 However, the agreement qualified this willingness in the following
declaration:
2 LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD
NUCLEAR ORDER 13 (1987).
' Id. at 15. Scheinman argues that the period lasted from 1946 through 1953. Id.
4 See id. at 17.
' Seeid. at 17-18.
6 See id. at 19.
See PAUL C. SZASZ, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY I-12 (International Atomic Energy Agency Legal Series No. 7, 1970).
s See id. at II.
9 See id. at 1-12.
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6... We [the signatories of the trilateral agreement] are not
convinced that the spreading of the specialized information
regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it
is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and enforceable
safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute to a
constructive solution of the problem of the atomic bomb. On
the contrary we think it might have the opposite effect. We
are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with
others of the United Nations, detailed information concerning
the practical industrial application of atomic energy just as
soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for
destructive purposes can be devised.'0
This had the practical effect of withholding atomic energy information until
an effective security system could be established." The signatories felt that
such a security system was necessary to guarantee that this information would
not be used for destructive purposes.' 2 The United States affirmed this policy
of secrecy in 1946 by enacting the Atomic Energy Act.'3 The act, like the
trilateral declaration, prohibited nuclear cooperation until effective interna-
tional safeguards were in place.14 Thus, the original three took steps to ensure
that information about atomic energy would remain confidential and controlled
to prevent its misuse.
In the second stage, many countries had already "begun an inexorable
march toward an independent nuclear capability."' 5 This prompted the United
States to propose a new policy to meet these political realities, a policy now
based on the controlled dissemination of information.' 6 President Eisenhower
proposed the Atoms for Peace program to the United Nations in December
"o Id. at 12 (quoting Joint Declaration by the Heads of Government of the United States, the
United Kingdom and Canada, Nov. 15, 1945, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT,
1945-1959 1, 2 (U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No. 7008, 1960) (emphasis added).
", See SCHEINMAN, supra note 2, at 16. The declaration maintained that the "safeguards"
system it envisioned was the collective responsibility of the international community. Id. It
called on the United Nations to create a commission to deal with the nuclear challenge. Id.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 17.
14 See id.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 18.
2000]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
1953. His plan was to promote international cooperation on the peaceful use
of the atom.17
B. The Safeguards System
The key concept underlying Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program was
the creation of a safeguards system requiring states to submit to inspections to
ensure that nuclear matter was used only for peaceful purposes and was fully
accounted for."8 Under Atoms for Peace, the safeguards system was imple-
mented through bilateral treaties. 9 A supplying country could require the
receiving state to allow it to conduct such inspections.20
After the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United
States transferred inspection responsibility formerly held under treaties to the
Agency.2' In doing so, the United States faced great resistance from many of
the parties to the bilateral agreements. 22 Many countries felt that the creation
of a central inspection system headed by the IAEA would allow nations with
inspectors on the IAEA staff to gain technological advantages through
espionage activities.'3 Since its inception, the IAEA safeguard system has
been plagued by concerns about confidentiality within the Agency.
C. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Attempts to quell states' concerns about the vulnerability of confidential
information within the Agency were undertaken in the drafting of the statute
and staff regulations of the IAEA. For example, the statute attempted to make
clear that only those with the "highest standards of ... integrity" would be
"7 See id. Atoms for Peace was essential to negotiations for the development of the
International Atomic Energy Agency that was designed to maintain a "safeguards" system to
prevent the diversion of information for destructive purposes. Id. at 63-64.
" See id. at 30-31.
'9 See id. at 36.
2 See id. at 31. However, many of the United States bilateral treaties contained a proviso
that if an international agency were established, the responsibility for safeguards inspections
would be transferred to that agency. See id. at 36. By 1957, the year that the International
Atomic Energy Agency was established, the United States had bilateral agreements with over
twenty-four nations. See id.
21 See id. at 36.
22 See id. The transfer of all bilateral treaties was completed in the 1960s. See id. at 37.
2 See id. at 36-37.
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employed by the IAEA.24 Further, to reduce any conflicts of interest, the
"General Principles to be Observed in the Provisional Staff Regulations of the
Agency" emphasized that employees of the IAEA must be international civil
servants with no national responsibilities who would be loyal only to the
United Nations and to the Agency." The statute further provided that staff
members "shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position
as officials of the Agency; ... [and] they shall not disclose any industrial
secret or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason
of their official duties for the Agency."26 Finally, Staff Regulation 1. 11
required all members of the IAEA staff to take the following oath:
I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in
all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted
to me as an international civil servant of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, to discharge these functions and
regulate my conduct with the interests of the Agency only in
view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the
performance of my duties from any government or other
authority external to the Agency.27
Each of these provisions embodied an effort by the IAEA to earn the
confidence of member states in its ability to safeguard sensitive materials.
Throughout the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, there has
been a common concern with confidentiality issues.28
24 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, art. VII, para. D, reprinted in JOINT
COMMTTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 17 (Comm. Print 1957).
25 See SZASZ, supra note 7, at 735 (quoting General Principles to be Observed in the
Provisional Staff Regulations of the Agency, IAEA Doc. GC. I (S)/23; GC. I (S)/RES/1 3).
2 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 24, art. VII, para. F
(emphasis added).
27 SZASZ, supra note 7, at 781.
28 The concern for confidentiality is especially pressing now. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
regime "at one point nearly collapsed under the burden of its own complacency." Bombs, Gas
and Microbes, supra note 1, at 23. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, despite regular and
systematic IAEA inspections, reports indicated that Iraq was within a year or two of completing
a bomb and that North Korea had lied about how much plutonium it had produced. See id.
After these incidents surfaced, the IAEA was asked to devise a "far more intrusive inspection
system that would do more to deter cheats." Id. at 24. For this "intrusive" system to be
workable, the IAEA must have the cooperation of member states. This cooperation can only be
achieved if member states have confidence that the information gained in the inspections will
not be leaked to the public or sold to the highest bidder.
2000]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
II. CURRENT EVENTS HIGHLIGHT THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING
CONFIDENTIALITY IN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS
While this Note will focus on the entreaties for change within the
International Atomic Energy Agency, it is the recent incidents concerning
UNSCOM inspectors and employees in Iraq that have sparked many of the
Agency's concerns. In 1990, the United Nations first imposed economic
sanctions against Iraq in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.29 It was
resolved that these sanctions would not be lifted until Iraq eliminated all of its
weapons of mass destruction.30 Based on the terms of Security Council
Resolution 687, Iraq was supposed to "provide inventories of all material that
could be used for nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic
missiles."'" To ensure compliance with this UN directorate, UNSCOM was
29 See Saddam's Sons Leave Aziz in the Dark on Banned Weapons, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16623688.
30 See id.
3' John J. Goldman & Norman Kempster, Nuclear Deception by Iraq Charged, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1991, at Al. Resolution 687 provides in relevant part:
The Security Council,....
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or
rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all
related subsystems and components and all research, development, support
and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related
major parts, and repair and production facilities; ...
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or
components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities
related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Direc-
tor-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days
of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations,
amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nu-
clear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and
removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and
cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the
Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accor-
dance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent
on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as
appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in
paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its
compliance with these undertakings;...
[The Security Council] [tjakes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq... [pursuant to the]
present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free
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created. a2 One of the most effective tools that UNSCOM employs to fulfill its
duties is the routine inspection of Iraqi plants and facilities.3 Such inspections
allow the United Nations to inventory the weapons that Iraq possesses, to
remove or destroy weapons, and to ensure that new biological and chemical
weapons are not being created.34 By nature, these subjects are highly sensitive.
Iraq is forced to display its most confidential information to an international
organization employing 120 people of twenty-five different nationalities. 5
The problem is exacerbated when the international organization appears to be
unable to guarantee that information compiled by these inspectors will not be
leaked to other countries.
Iraq has latched on to the "confidentiality movement" in order to fight
inspection attempts by both UNSCOM and the IAEA. On October 29, 1997,
from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global
ban on chemical weapons.... S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981 st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991) (emphasis added).
32 See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 31. Resolution 687 states that:
9. (b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate
Governments[,] . . . shall develop, and submit to the Council for
approval, a plan calling for...
(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out
immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile
capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any
additional locations by the Special Commission itself...
(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for
destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the
requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8
(a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the
Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction
by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its
missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph
8 (b) above....
Id.
3 See id. The Resolution provides for inspections as follows:
9. (a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General,... a declaration of the
locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and
agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;...
10. [The Security Council] requests the Secretary-General, in consultation
with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this para-
graph .....
Id.
3' See id.; see also Goldman & Kempster, supra note 31.
35 UNSCOM Throws Out US Arms Inspector for Illegal Use of Camera, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16623686.
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Iraq accused Americans on UNSCOM inspection teams of being spies and
banned them from conducting inspections in Iraq.36 This stand-off culminated
on August 5, 1998, when Iraq suspended arms inspections. It did, however,
allow UNSCOM to continue routine monitoring.37 On October 31, 1998, Iraq
took the final step and severed all dealings with United Nations inspectors.38
Before this breakdown in Iraqi-UN relations occurred, however, several
incidents strengthened Iraq's claims thatUNSCOM was merely an intelligence
mission for United Nations member states. These incidents prompted the
current debate within the IAEA about how to guarantee that confidential
material gained in nuclear facility inspections will remain secret.
The first incident involved the resignation of UNSCOM inspector Scott
Ritter on August 26, 1998.39 Ritter's resignation was tendered in the midst of
Iraq's continued refusal to cooperate with inspection programs.4° Controversy
arose concerning information Ritter conveyed in interviews after his
resignation from the international organization. In one interview with a Tel
Aviv newspaper, Ritter revealed that the Special Commission had relied on
Israeli intelligence to aid in "unmasking Iraq's concealment of its chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons programmes."'  The former inspector
maintains that "if it weren't for Israel, the Special Commission would not have
36 Chronology of the Iran [sic]- UN Standoff, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 31, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 21781851.
17 Iraq Accuses Chilean UNSCOM Member of Spying, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 21,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16623033. Iraq determined that UNSCOM inspections were
conducted for the purpose of spying for the United States. General Hussam Mohammad Amin,
the Iraqi liaison to the United Nations Special Commission, charged: "Some inspectors, rather
a large number of inspectors, are doing their work not for the objectives of the UN... but for
their own purposes which are related to intelligence activities." Id.
"' Chronology of the Iran-UN Standoff, supra note 36.
39 Scott Ritter Resigns as UN Weapons Inspector for Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug.
27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16586518. Ritter, a former intelligence officer in the Marine
Corps, joined UNSCOM in September 1991. See id. Ritter resigned from his post as UN
inspector maintaining that both the United States and the UN were too soft on Saddam Hussein's
non-compliance with inspection policies. See id. In his resignation letter, Ritter stated: "The
issue of unrestricted access, is, in my opinion, the cornerstone of any viable inspection
regime.... Unfortunately others do not share this opinion, including the Security Council and
the United States." Id. Ritter's resignation has "reignited the debate over U.N. policies in Iraq."
CNN Today: Top U.N. Weapons Inspector Resigns Over U.N. Politics with Iraq (Cable News
Network broadcast, Aug. 27, 1998).
0 Chronology of the Iran-UN Standoff, supra note 36.
41 Iraq Protests UN Confirmation of Weapons Inspectors' Links with Israel, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16611085.
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been able to carry out the anti-concealment effort."" These same allegations
also were reported in the Washington Post.43 The Post carried a more detailed
description of the Israeli contribution, including the fact that intelligence was
shared with Israel from spy planes that had been loaned by the United States
to UNSCOM. 4
UN Special Commission Chairman Richard Butler was "furious over Mr.
Ritter's exposure of a link with Israeli intelligence" and immediately
responded to Ritter's allegations.45 Butler sent Ritter a letter reprimanding him
for breaching the UN confidentiality mandate by disclosing information
regarding both Israeli cooperation with UNSCOM and Iraq's weapon-making
capabilities.' The letter stated that Ritter "was in violation of his UN contract
in making public confidential information that had come to his knowledge
through his job at the UN."'47 Butler also reportedly "warned" Ritter not to
divulge any other confidential information acquired in his official duties with
the UN. ' The Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, approved of this
admonition.49 A spokesperson for the UN summed up the problem that the
UN, UNSCOM, and the IAEA face with errant inspectors. When asked
whether any punitive action was planned for Ritter, the spokesperson




45 Ian Black, Weapons Team Fumes at UN Caution on Iraq, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct.
29, 1998, Foreign Page.
"Butler Reprimands Former Weapons Inspector for Speaking Out, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16610780. In his letter, Butler reminded Ritter that
"all officials of the UN and UNSCOM sign an undertaking not to reveal matters that should not
be revealed publicly, which they've obtained in their official duty." Barbara Crossette, Chief
UNArms Inspector in Iraq Orders Subordinate to Respect Vows ofSilence, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 3, 1998, at 4.
41 Id. Butler stated to reporters that "[Ritter] has said some things that I regret ... in some
cases [he has] revealed info he shouldn't have revealed because it was obtained in the course of
his official duty," and he is under the obligation not to disclose "proprietary information." Betsy
Pisik, Inspector Dismisses Threat of Iraqi Bomb; Says Baghdad Not Close on the Weapon,
WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1998, at AI. In early October, Ritter allegedly threatened to sue Butler
for his comments implying that Ritter had broken the law. See Arms Inspections in Iraq on
Hold, But Words Fly at U.N., DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 12, 1998, at 9A, available in 1998
WL 13109744. Butler apologized for accusing Ritter of breaking the law, stating that Ritter
misunderstood him "if he understood that I meant he broke American law.... All that I meant
was that he violated his commitments to the United Nations." Id.
48 Pisik, supra note 47.
49 Id.
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responded that "we don't have a prison or court system here" at the UN."° The
availability of retributive measures, if available at all, is extremely unclear.
Three other incidents have left both the UN and member states wondering
if confidential information could be protected under the international system.
One involved the confiscation of film and a camera from a Chilean helicopter
pilot employed by UNSCOM. s' Iraq accused the pilot of spying by taking
unauthorized photographs of "sensitive equipment" at a test field. 2 The head
of UNSCOM consulted with Chilean authorities and determined that the pilot
should "be withdrawn from Iraq because of his breach of UNSCOM rules."53
Iraq again expressed concern that several of the inspectors and employees of
UNSCOM were taking advantage of their positions with the international
organization to conduct intelligence missions. 4
A similar incident involved an American weapons inspector, also employed
by UNSCOM, who photographed an Iraqi missile site on October 8, 1998.-"
The United States inspector was ordered to leave Iraq and was recalled by the
commission to face espionage charges.5 6
The final incident involved allegations made by a senior British arms
inspector that Russian members of the Special Commission were leaking
UNSCOM information to Iraq. 7 The British inspector claimed that after
hearing rumors of Russian confidentiality breaches "at a top planning
meeting ... [] we planted a false brief which went straight up the line of
command back to the Iraqis.
Many continue to question the role of the IAEA in nuclear facility
inspections. Recently, NBC broadcast a news story that supported the claim
that weapons inspections have been conducted merely to gather national
intelligence. 9 The news report alleged that United States intelligence agencies
used weapons inspections as a cover to develop the capacity to track Saddam
so Butler Reprimands Former Weapons Inspector for Speaking Out, supra note 46.
" See Iraq Accuses Chilean UNSCOM Member of Spying, supra note 37.
52 id.
" Chilean UNSCOM Member to [Be] Removed From Iraq for Rules Violation, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESsE, Oct. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16625003.
54 See id.
ss See US. Arms Inspector Recalledfrom Iraq on Espionage, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE,
Oct. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19490504.
56 See id.
17 See Charmian Evans, Arms Team Forced to Let Saddam Off Hook, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Oct. 25, 1998, § 1, at 24.
58 Id.
s9 NBC Nightly News: Spy Story (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 6, 1999).
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Hussein and to eavesdrop on his personal radio telephone network.'
According to the broadcast, sources reported that in 1996, a United States
weapons inspector planted a series of eavesdropping devices at inspection sites
in Iraq.6' Information obtained through these devices was sent to Maryland for
decoding and then turned back over to the UN to aid in the inspection of Iraqi
61weapons. 2 Sources claimed that the United States also used this information
to select targets for the December 1998 air strikes on Iraq.63 While the State
Department and President Clinton deny that the United States worked with
UNSCOM for the purpose of undermining the Iraqi regime, experts fear that
these allegations of espionage might cause the demise of weapons
inspections.'
These incidents seem to prove that UN member states have a valid reason
to be concerned about their national security when arms inspectors are allowed
to roam their top-secret nuclear facilities. Furthermore, what would happen
if the threat of termination of employment with UNSCOM or the IAEA was
not a sufficient deterrent against sharing confidential materials? Unlike the
Chilean pilot and the United States inspector who were ordered to leave Iraq
and presumably their positions with UNSCOM, Inspector Scott Ritter
voluntarily resigned. In the latter scenario, what punitive measures could be
designed to prevent ex-inspectors from leaking confidential information
gained in their official capacities? The effectiveness of the weapons and
nuclear facility inspection regime is critically dependent on the confidence of
member states in the UN's ability to keep confidential material undisclosed.
III. A RESOURCE FOR CHANGE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AG9NCY
A. The "Advanced" Confidentiality Regime of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
One international organization that has anticipated confidentiality issues
and has implemented a strictly detailed system to address potential problems
is the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons (OPCW or the
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undertakings in the field.65 The policies and goals of the OPCW may possibly
serve as a model for change within the IAEA itself.
Effective April 29, 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention became an
international treaty banning the production, use, or storage of chemical
weapons and calling for the destruction of existing chemical weapons.' The
OPCW was established to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention
("the Convention").67
From its inception, the OPCW prioritized a policy of strict confidentiality.
The OPCW recognized that "[a] policy for confidential information is essential
to the work of the organization because of the intrusive [inspection] measures
which are aimed at promoting confidence in compliance with the Convention
while respecting States Parties' legitimate concerns about the possible
disclosure of sensitive information. 68 In accordance with the Annex on the
Protection of Confidential Information to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality ("the OPCW Policy") was adopted on
May 16, 1997.69
The fundamental elements of the OPCW Policy outlined the detailed and
precise method of balancing the Organization's need for information with the
states parties' need for discretion in disclosing information critical to national
security. The first step in the method was to set an ideal goal that the
65 Letter from Larry D. Johnson, Legal Advisor and Director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency's Legal Division, to the author (Nov. 13, 1998) (on file with The Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law).
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, done Jan. 13, 1993, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. 800
[hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
67 The Chemical Weapons Convention-A Guided Tour (visited Jan. 7, 1999) <http://www.
opcw.org/guide.htm>.
68 Guidelinesfor Procedures on the Release of ClassifiedInformation by the OPCW, OPCW
C-I/Dec. 13, pt. 1, para. 2 (May 16, 1997) (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.opcw.org/ci/ci-
decl3.htm> [hereinafter Guidelines]. The OPCW further recognizes that "the Convention
embodies a balance between that disclosure necessary to enhance confidence in compliance with
the Convention, and the prevention of disclosure of information not relevant to the Convention,
in order to protect national security .. " Id. pt. I, para. 3. The OPCW policy sets out a method
for these competing interests to coexist. Id.
69 Id. (adopting the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality that is annexed to decision). The
Chemical Weapons Convention's "Confidentiality Annex" also provides general principles for
the handling of confidential material, sets out the conduct and employment of personnel
handling confidential materials, calls for measures to prevent disclosure of confidential data in
the course of on-site inspections, and provides that the Director-General of the Organization
shall establish procedures to be followed in case of breaches. See Chemical Weapons
Convention, supra note 66, Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information.
[Vol. 28:349
IAEA CONFIDENTIALITY
Organization was to achieve through the OPCW Policy.7 ° The principle
adopted was that "no information obtained by the Organization in connection
with the implementation of this Convention shall be published or otherwise
released," except as specifically provided for.7'
The second element of the OPCW Policy was that the Organization would
be committed to obtaining the least information necessary to meet the
requirements of the Convention.7 2 To accomplish this task, the Organization
would need to be very precise in specifying its requirements for information
from a state party.73
The third fundamental element of the Organization's Policy on Confidenti-
ality was an elaborate classification system that set out factors and formulas
by which confidential information was classified into levels of sensitivity.7'
Classification is a two step process. Once information has been gathered, the
Organization and the state party cooperate to determine if the materials contain
confidential information.75 Then, each confidential part "must be given a
classification, based on established categories which respond to the level of
sensitivity of confidential information., 76 Once given a classification, unless
otherwise indicated by the state party providing the confidential information,
the duration of the protection is presumed to be unlimited.77
The fourth element of the OPCW Policy was related to the classification
system. An aim of the OPCW was to limit access to confidential information
to the least number of people possible.78 The scope of dissemination of
70 See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 66, Annex on the Protection of
Confidential Information, para. A.2(c).
71 Id.; see also Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. III, para. 9.
72 See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. II, para. 3(a).
73 See id.
74 See id. pt. V.
75 See id. pt. III, paras. 10-12.
76 Id. pt. V, para. 1.1. Part V of the Policy on Confidentiality defines three categories:
"OPCW RESTRICTED," "OPCW PROTECTED," and "OPCW HIGHLY PROTECTED," and
provides classification criteria for each category. Id. pt. V, para. 1.3. For example, an item
characterized as "OPCW HIGHLY PROTECTED" is one that would "cause serious damage to
the effectiveness or credibility of the Convention,. . . or cause serious damage from the point
of view of national security or commercial secrecy to the interests of a State Party .. " Id. pt.
V, para. 1.14. The OPCW Policy provides that during an inspection, an inspection team shall
give information viewed the level of protection afforded to "OPCW HIGHLY PROTECTED."
Id. pt. V, para. 1. 16.
" See id. pt. V, para. 3.1. However, it is indicated that the state party or the Organization
may periodically review designations of confidentiality "with a view to either declassification,
reduction of classification, or release." Id. pt. V, para. 3.2.
"S See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. II, para. 3(d).
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confidential information may be partially determined by the level of sensitivity
the item of information was adjudged to possess.79 Further, "[tlhe dissemina-
tion of confidential information . . . shall be strictly on a need-to-know
basis."'
By using two additional methods, the Organizations makes information
harder to access. First, the OPCW Policy directs the Secretariat of the
Organization to store confidential information in a way that "precludes direct
identification with the facility [to which] it refers. . . ."" Second, all
confidential information needed during the "actual conduct of an onsite
inspection" shall be kept at the inspected facility and will only be available for
on-site use.82 This procedure eliminates the chance that confidential
information will be lost, diverted, copied, or stolen while the information is in
transport from the facility to the Organization.
A fifth fundamental element of the Policy on Confidentiality was the
commitment to the selection and training of staff members to ensure that each
staff member of the OPCW meets "the highest standards of efficiency,
competence, and integrity."83  The Secretariat has the responsibility to
"maintain a continuing programme of training and awareness for all staff on
confidentiality issues.... ."' In conjunction with this responsibility and as an
incentive for employees to abide by the Policy on Confidentiality, a staff
member's record on handling confidential materials will be an "explicit
element of [his] performance evaluation.' 85
The final element provided the "teeth" of the OPCW Policy on Confidenti-
ality. It detailed the procedures to be followed in the event of breaches of
confidentiality or violations of confidentiality obligations. 6 Part IX of the
OPCW Policy recognized the need for punitive measures to encourage
compliance with the policy regulations.8 7 Several sanctions are prescribed by
" See id. pt. V, para. 1.4.
80 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 66, Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information, para. A.2(h).
8' Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. IV, para. 1.3.2(0.
82 Id. pt. V, paras. 1.15(d), 1.16.
8 Id. pt. 11, para. 3(f).
u Id. pt. IV, para. 1.3.2(d).
85 Id.
86 See id. pt. IX, para. 1.
87 Id. pt. IX. This section sets out the steps to be taken by the Director-General of the
OPCW if there is an indication or allegation of a breach of confidentiality. See id. The process
begins with an investigation. See id. pt. IX. 1, paras. 3.1-3.9. If a prima facie case of a breach
or violation of confidentiality is established, interim action is taken to ensure that the breach will
not continue while the investigation process is conducted. See id. pt. IX. 1, paras. 4.1-4.4. Then,
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the policy as punitive measures. One option is to take disciplinary action
within the Organization against current staffimembers." For serious breaches,
the Organization may decide to waive the immunity of the offending staff
member.89 Following a waiver of immunity, "legal proceedings [may be]
conducted under the national jurisdiction of a State Party. . . .", Disputes
implicating states parties as offenders will be sent to a "Confidentiality
Commission" convened for that purpose.9'
Former staff members of the OPCW who are found to have violated the
Organization's confidentiality mandates may face sanctions which could
include the loss of pension rights and cancellation of residual financial or
related entitlements. 9 The Organization may also waive immunity from
prosecution for actions taken during the former staff member's term of service
with the OPCW.93 This guarantees that legal proceedings may be brought
against former as well as current employees of the Organization.
This confidentiality policy of the OPCW is an extremely comprehensive
and far-reaching example of one international organization's efforts to carve
out a workable system to prevent confidentiality breaches.
a full report of the investigation will be made by the Director-General and action can then be
taken in response to this report. See id. pt. IX.1, paras. 5.1-5.6.
8 Id. pt. IX. 1, para. 6(a).
89 See id. pt. IX. 1, para. 9.1.
'0 Id. pt. IX. 1, para. 6(b).
91 See id. pt. IX i, para. 11.3. The Confidentiality Annex to the Chemical Weapons
Convention required that a "subsidiary organ of the Conference" be set up in case of a breach
involving both the OPCW and a State Party. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 66,
Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, para. D.23. This organ shall be a
"Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality." Id. Pursuant to this
mandate, the Policy on Confidentiality sets forth rules governing the "Confidentiality
Commission." See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. IX.2. The Confidentiality Commission "shall
act without interference or direction from either the Secretariat or other organs of the
[Organization], but must follow any mandate of the Conference." Id. pt. IX.2, para. 3.9. The
aim of the Confidentiality Commission is to clarify the issue of the dispute and to resolve the
dispute "in a manner that is acceptable to the disputing parties and that is consistent with the
rights and obligations of States Parties and the [Organization] under the Convention." Id. pt.
IX.2, para. 3.2. The means adopted for resolution would "preferably comprise a mediation
process practically geared to reaching an agreed settlement through negotiation." Id.
See id. pt. IX. 1, para. 8.
9 See id. pt. IX. , para. 9.1.
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B. Secrets to Success-Strengths of the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality
Although the Organization's Policy on Confidentiality has been in effect
for less than three years, there are several features of the policy that, in theory,
make it a good candidate for success. However, the OPCW has run into some
practical problems in applying its Policy on Confidentiality. Addressing the
strengths and weaknesses of the OPCW Policy may guide the IAEA in making
changes to its own confidentiality policy.
There are many features of the OPCW Policy that appear to be strengths.
First, both the Confidentiality Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the Policy on Confidentiality are evidence that the Organization has placed
a priority on the confidentiality of the information it collects. Second, the
Organization itself plays a greater role in the confidentiality regime as the
Director-General of the Organization "is specifically tasked with primary
responsibility for the protection of confidential information .. . [and] for
supervising adherence to the confidentiality regime .... , This is in contrast
to the IAEA in which staff members shoulder the primary responsibility for
maintaining confidential materials.95
Instilling this responsibility at the highest level of the OPCW demonstrates
a commitment of the entire Organization to a policy of no tolerance for the
dissemination of confidential materials. It also provides the leadership
necessary to implement this policy.
A third strength of the OPCW Policy is its attempt to limit both the quantity
of confidential information it receives and the number of people who have
access to this information.' This is important because there will be less
information to protect as confidential and fewer individuals who can leak the
confidential materials.
The Policy on Confidentiality also provides an incentive to staff members
to handle confidential materials carefully.97 The Chemical Weapons
Convention requires that when a supervisor evaluates the performances of
inspectors and other staff members, "special attention shall be given to the
94d. pt. IV, paras. 1.2.1-1.2.2.
95 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 24, art. VII, para. F. The
only reference to confidentiality in the statute that created the IAEA is found in the article
enumerating the responsibilities of the Agency's staff. Id. The statute provides that staff
members "shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information coming to
their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the Agency." Id.
See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. II, paras. 3(a)-3(e).
Id. pt. IV, para. 1.3.2(d).
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employee's record regarding protection of confidential information. 98
Therefore, an inspector'sjob security, advancement, and salary are dependent
in part on his ability to maintain the confidentiality of the information he
handles.
Another strength of the OPCW Policy is the detailed procedure on how
breaches and violations of the policy will be handled." This procedure is
important for several reasons. First, it warns employees of the consequences
that follow breaches of confidentiality regulations.'O° Second, the procedure
for handling breaches sets out concrete guidelines to be followed from the
Organization's inception. This is important to avoid the piecemeal develop-
ment of such a policy that may evolve through trial and error responses to
actual violations and breaches.
Third, the detailed regulations on security breaches allow states parties to
have confidence that the materials they submit in compliance with the
Chemical Weapons Convention will remain confidential.°' An important part
of creating this confidence is allowing states to participate in the process of
identifying and punishing breaches. States may bring breaches to the attention
of the Organization.10 2  They will be kept informed during the breach
investigation"0 3 and may have a chance to prosecute the offender in their
national courts °4 Further, a special commission will be created as a venue for
the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality. 5
98 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 66, Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information, para. B. 12.
" See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. IX (detailing breach procedures).
100 See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 66, Annex on the Protection of
Confidential Information, paras. B.5-12. Each staff member must sign a "secrecy agreement"
with the Technical Secretariat covering a period beginning with his date of hire by the
organization and extending five years after his employment is terminated. Id. para. B.9.
Further, employees are "advised and reminded about security considerations and of the possible
penalties that they would incur in the event of improper disclosure." Id. para. B. 10.
'o' See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. I, para. 2 (maintaining that "need for disclosure of
appropriate information to demonstrate compliance with the Convention should be matched by
credible reassurances for States parties that.., any confidential material, once disclosed, will
be appropriately protected").
102 See id. pt. IX.1, para. 3.1(b).
'03 See id. pt. IX. 1, para. 5.2.
'04 See id. pt. IXI1, paras. 9.3, 10.1.
'o- See id. pt. IX.2 (describing the procedures of the Confidentiality Commission). The
Operating Procedures of the Confidentiality Commission have recently been adopted and are set
forth in OPCW Doc. C-III/Dec. 10 Annex (Nov. 27, 1998) <http://www.opcw.org/ciii/ciiidc 10.
htm>.
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While the confidentiality regime created by the OPCW is far-reaching and
elaborate, it is not a static system. The regulations stress that a continuing goal
of the Organization is enhancement and reform of the confidentiality regime
itself.'06
As these features have been put into practice, however, the OPCW has run
into some problems. The IAEA should avoid making the same mistakes when
it revises its confidentiality policy. For example, because the OPCW Policy
is so detailed and comprehensive, the administrative burden of implementing
it has been enormous. 0 7 By design, this enormous burden has fallen on the
shoulders of a comparatively small number of overworked staff members.'"8
The OPCW also has had difficulty obtaining the cooperation and compliance
of states parties to the obligations of the confidentiality policy. As of July
1999, a majority of states parties had not provided information to the OPCW
regarding how OPCW confidential information would be handled within the
states'jurisdictions.'°9 The OPCW also has requested the help of states parties
to reduce the burden on the handling of confidential information.1 0 OPCW
requests that states parties consider re-assessing the original classifications, as
appropriate, of all initial declarations to the Organization."' OPCW also
requests that states submit all correspondence relating to declarations or final
inspection reports to the Confidentiality Branch of the Verification Division,
by hand delivery if possible." 2 The Organization believes this will not only
help to expedite processing but also will provide greater protection to sensitive
" See generally Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. IX, paras. 6(a), 12.1, 12.2 (calling for the
reform and enhanccment of the confidentiality regime). One such example involves the
requirement that every breach investigation report contain "concrete proposals for the reform
or enhancement of the protection of confidential information within the Organisation, both
specifically to prevent the recurrence of any breach or violation established by the investigation,
and on the basis of other observations about the general protection of confidentiality which may
emerge from the investigation." Id. pt. IX. 1, para. 12.1.
107 See Report of the Organisation on the Implementation of the Convention, C-I1I/2/Rev.2
and Corr. 1, par. 2.8 (Dec. 5, 1997) (visited Feb. 7,2000) <http://www.opcw.org/cii/cii-2r.htm>
[hereinafter Report on Implementation]. Some issues that were unforeseen in the preparatory
phrase have arisen. The sheer volume of data processed and sent to states parties regarding
declaration information has imposed a "substantial additional workload on the Declarations and
Confidentiality Branches in the Verification Division." Id. Plus, there is a great security risk
involved in generating large volumes of classified information in hard copy form. See id.
1'3 See id. para. 2.22(g).
109 See Report ofthe Fourth Session of the Conference ofthe States Parties, OPCW C-IV/6,
para. 10.2 (July 2, 1999) (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.opcw.org/civ/civ6.htm>.
"o See Report on Implementation, supra note 107, para. 2.16.
... See id. para. 2.16(b).
112 See id. para. 2.16(c).
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information."' This procedure will ensure that information sent by states does
not end up in the wrong hands or that it does not pass through many different
channels before being delivered to the Confidentiality Branch.
The OPCW has had some bureaucratic and administrative difficulties with
its confidentiality system. Perhaps these difficulties suggest that the IAEA
should follow a policy somewhere in between the top-down approach of the
OPCW and the vague, indeterminate course of the IAEA's current policy.
IV. SOLUTIONS AND THEIR PRACTICAL VIABILITY
Allegations that weapons inspections conducted by UN organizations are
merely covers for intelligence gathering missions are rampant."4 The IAEA
must take immediate action to restore confidence in its activities or risk losing
the major tool (nuclear facility inspections) used to accomplish the goals of the
Agency.' 5 This section will chronicle the steps currently being taken by the
IAEA in response to these allegations and will also propose possible solutiqns
to the "confidentiality crisis."
There are several general ways in which the IAEA could maintain the
integrity of confidential materials gained through nuclear facility inspections.
First, the Agency could raise barriers to keep staff members from leaking or
selling confidential information gained in their official capacities. Second, the
Agency could attempt to decrease the black market demand for confidential
materials. Finally, the IAEA could increase incentives for staff members,
which would encourage them not to disclose sensitive information. I propose
that a combination of these general solutions, in conjunction with the actions
presently being taken by the IAEA, would decrease significantly the risk of
confidentiality breaches.
113 See id.
"14 See supra Part I.
"5 "The Agency carries out most of its inspections and other safeguards activities under
agreements concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), which requires each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty to declare and submit
to Agency safeguards all the nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities carried out within
the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere." IAEA Press
Release: Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in 1997 (Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.iaea.org/
worldatom/Press/P-release/pr-archive.shtml>, then click on Implementation of IAEA
Safeguards in 1997.
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A. Current Attempts by the IAEA to Reduce Breaches of Confidentiality
In a lecture to an international law class at the University of Georgia, the
director of the IAEA's legal division highlighted the problems that the.JAEA
faces because of its unique obligations." 6 First, the Agency has an obligation
to each of its member states. " Second, the IAEA has an internal relationship
with and obligation to its staff members."' While the Agency has immunity
from defending actions, member states have asked for assurances that the
Agency would waive its immunity if one of the Agency's employees were to
disclose confidential materials." 9 While the IAEA claims to be unable to
provide such an assurance, it did offer to confirm that its staff members are
aware that confidentiality breaches are very serious matters. 2 '
In an effort to highlight its strong stance on confidentiality matters, the
Secretariat of the Agency issued a Notice Concerning Obligations to Protect
Confidential Information ("the Notice") to all staff members.' The Notice
has three goals. First, it serves to remind staff members of their obligations,
under both the statute of the IAEA and the Provisional Staff Regulations, not
to disclose confidential information. 2  Second, the Notice sets forth the
procedure to be followed in the event of a complaint of unauthorized
disclosure.123 There are several disciplinary procedures that may be invoked
by the Agency in the event of a breach of confidentiality. One is to take
internal disciplinary action such as written censure, suspension without pay,
116 Larry D. Johnson, Legal Advisor and Director of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's Legal Division, Address to University of Georgia, International Law I Class (Oct. 12,





12, See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, IAEA Doc. SEC/NOT/1 742 (Aug.
7, 1998) (on file with The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law).
'2 Id. paras. 2-4. Paragraph four of the Notice reminds staff members that their "obligation
to protect the confidentiality of such information continues after the staff [members']
employment with the Agency" pursuant to Provisional Staff Regulation 1.06.
12- Id. paras. 6-12. Once the Agency receives a complaint from a Member State alleging
improper conduct by an IAEA staff member, the Director General will initiate an investigation.
See id. para. 7. After the investigation is concluded, the Director General shall report his
conclusions to the state concerned and decide whether to implement disciplinary action under
Provisional Staff Rule 11.01.1. See id. paras. 8-10.
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demotion, dismissal, or summary dismissal. 24 Another disciplinary measure
is outlined in Staff Rule 13.03.4.2' This rule allows the Agency to be
reimbursed by a staff member "either partially or in full for any financial loss
suffered by the Agency as a result of his/her negligence or of his/her having
violated any regulation, rule or administrative instruction.""26 Finally, in the
event of an intentional or grossly negligent disclosure without the proper
authorization, the Director-General may waive any immunity that pertains to
the individual.'27 Then, "criminal or civil legal proceedings could be initiated
against a staff member, or former staff member, in any applicable national
jurisdiction. ,,2
The purpose of the Secretariat Notice is to request that all staff members
sign a "Confidentiality Undertaking" prepared by the Agency.1 29  The
undertaking contains provisions analogous to those set forth in the Notice itself
and is intended to "underscore to all staff members the importance of the
safekeeping and handling of secret or confidential information coming to the
individual's knowledge as a result of his/her work with the Agency., ' 30
Soon after issuing this first Notice requiring staff members to sign the
Confidentiality Undertaking, the Agency released a second Secretariat
Notice.' The second notice was issued to respond to two concerns raised by
a number of staff members with respect to the Confidentiality Undertaking.'3"
124 Id. para. 6 (referencing Staff Rule 11.01.1). It is noted that in the event of summary
dismissal, the staff member would forfeit any termination indemnity, repatriation grant, or end-
of service allowance to which he is otherwise entitled. See id. para. 10.
's See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, supra note 121, para. 11 (describing
Staff Rule 13.03.4).
126 Id.
127 See id. para. 12.
128 Id.
129 Id. para. 13.
230 Id. The Confidentiality Undertaking provides in part, "I understand: (a) that a breach of
my obligation not to disclose confidential information without appropriate authorization, as
provided for in the terms and conditions of my employment with the Agency, including this
Undertaking, may result in the imposition of disciplinary measures as provided for in the
Provisional Staff Regulations and the Staff Rules." Obligations to Protect Confidential
Information, supra note 121, Attachment 1, para. 4 (Confidentiality Undertaking for Staff
Members).
"' See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, Addendum 1, IAEA Doc.
SEC/NOT/1742 Add.1 (1998) (on file with The Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law).
232 See id. para. 3.
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The first concern took issue with provision 4(b) of the undertaking 3 3 that
providesi
that legal proceedings could be initiated against me [the staff
member] in any applicable national jurisdiction, during or
after my employment with the Agency, in the event of a
breach of my obligation not to disclose confidential informa-
tion without appropriate authorization, and that, for such
purpose, the Director-General may waive any immunity
which may pertain to me.
134
Staff members felt that by signing the undertaking they were, in effect,
waiving any applicable defenses and were "inviting Member States to take
legal action against [them]" in the case of confidentiality breaches.1 35 The
second Secretariat Notice addressed this concern by assuring staff members
that provision 4(b) referred only to the possibility of a waiver of an individ-
ual's immunity "in order to allow the Agency to initiate, if necessary, legal
proceedings. ..
The second concern of staff members was that the Agency did not have a
system in place to identify what information was considered to be
confidential. 137 In response, the Agency reiterated that the obligation to protect
confidential materials was "not a new one."' 38 The Agency did concede,
however, that its procedures for classifying confidential materials perhaps
needed to be reviewed.
39
Since the Agency maintains that the Confidentiality Undertaking is merely
a restatement of the existing obligations of its staff members, it is necessary
to determine what these confidentiality obligations are. Two major bodies of
authority exist on this subject. The first is the statute creating the IAEA.' 40
The statute provides that duties of the staff members of the IAEA include
refraining from "any action which might reflect on their positions as officials
of the Agency" and not disclosing "any industrial secret or other confidential
133 See id.
" Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, supra note 121, Attachment 1.
135 Obligations to Protect Confidential lnformation, Addendum 1, supra note 131, para. 3(a).
136 Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
17 See id. para. 3(b).
3 Id. para. I (note the paragraph cited is the second para. 1; presumably this is due to an
error in numbering in the document).
139 See id.
'o Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 24.
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information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the
Agency.'
141
The second body of authority on this subject is the Agreement on Privileges
and Immunities of the Agency ("the Agreement"). 42  The Agreement,
approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on July 1, 1959, sets forth the
legal capacity of the Agency, its employees, and the representatives of
members working with the Agency.44 Article VI of the Agreement specifi-
cally deals with the privileges and immunities afforded to "Officials"
employed by the IAEA.'" "Officials," for the purposes of the Agreement,
have been defined as "the Director General and all members of the staff of the
Agency except those who are locally recruited and assigned to hourly rates."
45
Pursuant to the Agreement, inspectors, as officials of the Agency:
shall be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their
official capacity . . . [and further] while exercising the
functions of inspector under Article XII of the Statute of the
Agency ... and while traveling in their official capacity en
route to and from the performance of these functions, enjoy
all the additional privileges and immunities set forth in
Article VII of this Agreement so far as is necessary for the
effective exercise of such functions."'
'41 Id. art. VII, para. F; see also supra Part I.C.
142 Agreementon the Privileges andImmunities oftheAgency, IAEADoc. INFCIRC/9/Rev.2
(July 26, 1967) <http:www.iaea.org/worldatom/infcircs/inf9r2.html>.
Id. Article XV of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency required that
the legal capacity, immunities, and privileges of the Agency and its staff be defined in a separate
agreement between the Agency and the members. See Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, supra note 24, art. XV, para. C
'" Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency, supra note 142, art. VI.
4 Id. art. I(v).
'" Id. art. VI, sec. 18(a)(i). Article VII, with respect to "Experts on Missions for the
Agency," provides as follows:
Section 23. Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article
VI) serving on committees of the Agency or performing missions for the
Agency, including missions as inspectors under Article XII of the Statute of
the Agency and at project examiners under Article XI thereof, shall be
accorded the following privileges and immunities so far as is necessary for
the effective exercise of their functions, including the time spent on journeys
in [connection] with service on such committees or missions:
(a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their
personal baggage;
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However, the Agreement explicitly qualifies this grant of immunity by stating:
Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the
interest of the Agency only and not for the personal benefit of
the individuals themselves. The Agency shall have the right
and the duty to waive the immunity of an official in any case
where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course
ofjustice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests
of the Agency. 47
The Board of Governors wished to make clear at the Agency's inception that
the privileges and immunities afforded to individuals could be waived. This
supports the Agency's position set forth in the Confidentiality Undertaking.
The Agency has the authority to waive any immunity that pertains to a staff
member allegedly in breach.'48 The second Secretariat Notice interpreted this
waiver to apply to circumstances in which the Agency may waive immunity of
the individual so that the Agency could institute proceedings against the person
in question. 49
Despite the Agency's interpretation, it still remains unclear whether the
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (quoted above) allows member states
to also institute proceedings against a staff member in the event of an
unauthorized disclosure.
The vagueness of the Privileges and Immunities Agreement waiver
provision appears to harm the confidentiality mission of the IAEA in two
ways. First, it offers no specific guidelines to which staff members must
adhere, and it provides no protections for staff members in cases of accidental
(b) In respect of words spoken or written or acts done by them in the
performance of their official functions, immunity from legal process of every
kind, such immunity to continue notwithstanding that the persons concerned
are no longer serving on committees of, or employed on missions for, the
Agency;
(c) Inviolability for all papers and documents;
(d) For the purposes of their communications with the Agency, the right
to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed
bags;...
Id. art. VII.
141 Id. art. VI, sec. 21 (emphasis added).
141 Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, supra note 121, Attachment 1, para.
4(b).
19 See supra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
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disclosures. 5 ° Second, the vague promise of a waiver of immunity when
"immunity would impede the course of justice" offers little assurance to
member states that there will be concrete consequences to any disclosure of
their confidential materials. 5'
B. Possible Future Actions to Decrease the Risk of Unauthorized Disclosures
From Within the IAEA
The two main weaknesses of the current policy of the IAEA are the lack of
a detailed procedure to be followed in the event of a breach and the lack of a
comprehensive system to uniformly classify information as confidential."'
Because of the inherent deficiencies in the current system of the IAEA,
correcting these weaknesses may require drastic political action, such as
amending the statute of the IAEA to provide for a comprehensive confidential-
ity regime or undertaking a new multilateral agreement between the IAEA and
its member states to provide for breach procedures.' 3 Amendments to the
statute of the IAEA may be proposed by any member. 54 The amendment will
take effect once a two-thirds majority of the General Conference approves it'
and two-thirds of the member states accept it in accordance with their
respective constitutional procedures. 56 Alternatively, the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Agency leaves open the possibility that new
agreements can be entered into between the Agency and any member states to
so Many staff members protested having to sign the Confidentiality Undertakings and voiced
the concerns detailed above. These concerns suggest that staff members are confused about their
prospective liability under the undertaking in the event of a confidentiality breach. See
Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, Addendum 1, supra note 131, para. 3. Staff
members have also suggested (and the Agency recognizes that its procedures on this subject may
well need to be reviewed) that guidelines to determine what materials are to be classified as
confidential are insufficient. See id.
... See Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency, supra note 142, art. VI,
sec. 21.
"2' See supra Part IV.A. (detailing the second notice issued by the IAEA Secretariat).
153 The statute of the IAEA does not explicitly provide for the formulation of multilateral
treaties as a function of the Agency. However, "it is apparent from the objective of the Agency
'to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world' may in some instances be furthered by the conclusion of multilateral
treaties among its Members." Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note
24, art. II.
's4 See id. art. XVIII, para. A.
's See id. art. XVIII, para. C(i).
156 See id. art. XVIII, para. C(ii). Note that if a member cannot accept an amendment to the
statute, it may, upon written notice, withdraw from the Agency. See id. art. XVIII, para. D.
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amend the current rights afforded by the Agreement." 7 These may take the
form of "supplemental agreements adjusting the provisions of this [Privileges
and Immunities] Agreement" or an agreement "extending or curtailing the
privileges and immunities thereby granted."' 8
The Agency has the ability procedurally to create a new policy on
confidentiality. Substantively, however, what should this policy include?
Amending the statute or drafting a new multilateral treaty would give the
Agency the opportunity to systematically clarify and strengthen the current
breach policies over the long term. One major goal of the Agency should be
to identify criteria and levels of sensitivity in listing information as confiden-
tial.' 59 An invaluable resource in constructing such a network is the OPCW's
Classification System discussed above in Part II.' 6 Establishing such a
procedure would eliminate all doubt on the part of staff members, the Agency,
and member states as to what information is to be protected.
A second obvious goal should be to set specific and detailed procedures to
be followed in the event of a breach. This policy would work with the current
breach policies to add more detail and clarity and to provide mandatory steps
for the Agency to follow in the event of an unauthorized disclosure.' 61 Such
a procedure should set out judicial measures available to member states and
should explain in what circumstances these measures may be initiated. The
procedure should also take into account that because staff members are only
employed for brief periods of time with the IAEA, enforcement of the rules is
especially critical after employment ends.'62 Punitive measures should be
created to deal with former staff members as well as current staff members. 63
" See Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, supra note 142, art. XI, sec. 36.
158 Id.
9 See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, Addendum 1, supra note 131, para.
3(b) (identifying the need for an adequate and uniform procedure to classify documents as
confidential).
"~ See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. V (setting out the details of the OPCW Classification
System for Confidential Information).
161 See supra Part IV.A (detailing the current breach procedures of the IAEA).
161 See generally SZASZ, supra note 7, at 765 (noting that most staff members of the IAEA
are not given permanent positions in an effort to maintain geographic diversity within the
Agency).
63 One current policy of the IAEA, set out in Staff Rule 13.03.4, allows the Agency to
recover from a staff member reimbursement for financial loss sustained by the Agency because
of an unauthorized disclosure. See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, supra note
121, para. 11 (citing Staff Rule 13.03.4). While the practicality of this provision may be
questionable, its language evidences that current breach policies are not applicable to former
staff members, only to currently employed staff members. All breach policy and procedures
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Again, the OPCW's Breach Policy will be a helpful working model for the
proposed changes, especially if the IAEA discards the aspects of the OPCW
Policy that have not been successful.'
A new treaty or amendment might also provide for increased staff
education on matters of confidentiality and how best to safeguard sensitive
materials. Such training would be important iti orienting staff members and
administrators alike to the new confidentiality rules and procedures to be
followed. Once more concrete rules of procedure have been established,
adherence to these rules can be enforced.
Finally, in promulgating new rules, the Agency should strive to take a more
active role not only in the leadership and implementation of the rules but also
in the responsibility of preventing unauthorized disclosures. Showing that the
Agency is serious about protecting confidential information may restore
confidence in the nuclear facility inspection system.
While these are general goals toward improving the long-term effectiveness
of the Agency, more immediate solutions are needed to improve the day-to-
day operations of the IAEA. One possibility includes petitioning the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an advisory opinion regarding the
proper interpretation of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the
Agency. 65 More specifically, the ICJ should focus on the provision providing
that "the Agency shall have the right and duty to waive the immunity of any
official in any case where, in its opinion the immunity would impede the
course of justice. . . ."'6 Such an opinion by the court should address the
circumstances in which the Agency can waive a staff member's immunity and
whether member states can also initiate legal proceedings against the accused
staff member. 67 Alternatively, because the Agency has not established a
should be made legally applicable to former staff members by virtue of their employment
contract with the Agency. For example, a policy to invalidate former staff members' pension
or other post-employment benefits may be a useful tool to deter confidentiality breaches.
'" See Guidelines, supra note 68, pt. IX (detailing OPCW breach procedures).
'6s See Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency, supra note 142, art. X,
sec. 34 (stating that "all differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present
Agreement shall be referred to the International Court of Justice..
'6 Id. art. VI, sec. 21.
167 See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, Addendum 1, supra note 131, para.
4 (raising the confusion and concern about a staff member's liability under the IAEA
Confidentiality Undertaking that is claimed to be a restatement of the staff members obligations
partially based on the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Agency). It should also
be noted that "[t]he Agency has never agreed to the submission of any dispute to a national
court, either in the abstract with respect to specified future controversies or with reference to any
current matter." SZASZ, supra note 7, at 950.
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general policy regarding the granting or refusals of waivers, the proposed
supplemental agreement to the Privileges and Immunities Agreement of the
Agency could also delineate such a policy. 68
Another immediate solution involves action by the Agency to reduce the
amount of confidential material collected and brought to the Agency by
facility inspectors. As was noted with respect to the OPCW's Policy, the less
sensitive information collected, the less information the Agency must protect
from disclosure. 69 This could be accomplished in conjunction with the long-
term goal of establishing a "Confidentiality Classification System." Only
materials that are absolutely necessary should be removed from the inspection
facility and transported to the Agency. Access to materials identified with
higher levels of sensitivity should be severely restricted.
Relatedly, a third immediate solution is to allow access to confidential
materials on a strictly "need-to-know" basis.70 One recent suggestion to
reduce inspectors' access to information is to implement a policy of "Remote
Monitoring.''. Unattended, remote monitoring includes the installation of
"digital surveillance cameras, electronic seals and motion and radiation
detectors" at nuclear facility inspection sites.' Information from the
surveillance equipment would be transferred using a remote data transmission
connected by a satellite link to the Agency in Vienna.' While this idea has
been suggested and tested in conjunction with maintaining the safety of
weapons in specific facilities, 74 it could also have application in the facility
inspection arena. Once a nuclear power facility has been identified, remote
surveillance equipment could be installed to ensure that the facility is not used
for the purpose of making weapons. This would permit "reductions in
inspection frequency and effort" and because surveillance would be monitored
268 See id. at 980.
269 See supra Part III.B (detailing the strengths of the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality).
270 This solution is complicated by the practical concern that one may not immediately know
the information or document is confidential. For example, a document submitted to the Agency
in a foreign language may have to go through several hands, including translators, before the
document's confidentiality can be assessed. A strong classification policy may eliminate some
of the confusion in cases like this, but there are still unusual situations requiring the discretion
and judgment of staff members. Evaluation of these cases should proceed on a case-by-case
basis. I
"72 See Dirk Schriefer, New Safeguards Measures: Initial Implementation and Experience,







by computers, this procedure would greatly limit staff member access to
sensitive materials.'75 Obviously, this system would not be effective in a
country like Iraq that is constantly moving its nuclear capabilities to dodge
inspection efforts.' 76 However, this may be an option in states with less
controversial nuclear energy programs.
Another immediate solution is to increase the incentives for staff members
to (1) not deliberately leak confidential information and (2) take extra
precautions when handling highly sensitive materials in order to prevent
accidental disclosure. One way to accomplish this would be to implement,
through Agency staff regulations, a reward/benefit system that is based on a
staff member's demonstrated ability to safely handle confidential materials. 
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A second incentive has been suggested by author Paul C. Szasz. 7 1 Szasz
notes that "[t]he most significant difference between the staff administration
of the Agency... and that of the United Nations... is that in the Agency, by
reason of an express policy anchored in the Statute, the permanent interna-
tional civil servants represent only a modest fraction of the staff."'7 The
inference follows that employees with life tenure have much more to lose by
breaking the Agency's rules.80 Thus, alternative employment practices may
' Id. Two such surveillance systems were installed in a facility in Switzerland in January
1996. See id. The program was to include a total of five facilities in Switzerland by the end of
1997 with future expansion proposed in the United States and in South Africa. Id.
16 United States diplomats charge that "sir'ce the end of the Persian Gulf War, Baghdad's
government has tried to hide as much of its nuclear arms program as possible by moving key
items into temporary storage." Goldman & Kempster, supra note 31. On one occasion,
inspectors informed the UN that while they were physically barred from entering a suspected
nuclear facility, they observed "frenzied activity" involving "cranes, trucks, and forklifts
hurriedly moving materials from the site." Id.
'" This suggestion is modeled after the policy of the OPCW that provides that in
performance evaluations, "specific attention shall be given to the employee's record regarding
protection of confidential information." Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 66, para.
12. The current practice of the Agency is that incremental payment increases are awarded each
year on the basis of "satisfactory service." SZASZ, supra note 7, at 78 (citing Staff Rule
5.01.3(B)). "Satisfactory service" is vaguely and broadly defined as "satisfactory performance
and conduct of staff members in their assignments as evaluated by their supervisors." Id.
1 See SzAsz, supra note 7, at 78.
Id. at 765. Szasz notes that this is a deliberate departure from recommendations made by
the UN that "the major part of the staff of [the] organization should consist of persons making
their careers in it." Id. The Agency departed from the protocol of the UN because it feared that
the scientists on its staff would "lose touch with developments in their fields if immured for too
long in the Agency." Id.
'o Currently, "[i]n view of the relatively brief service of most staff members with the
Agency, the question of promotion does not [even] play an important role in the Staff
Regulations." Id. at 777.
2000]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
need to be investigated because both promotions and salary raises could
potentially be large incentives to encourage staff members to uphold the
Agency's policy on confidentiality.
V. SUMMARY-WHY IS CHANGE So DESPERATELY NEEDED?
States have a right to be concerned because weapons and nuclear facility
inspections are viewed as an infringement on both a state's national sover-
eignty and security.' By their nature, nuclear power plant designs are highly
secretive and are extremely expensive to build. When an inspector visits,
many states fear that these design secrets, in which they have invested a great
deal of time and money, are vulnerable. 2
The present confidentiality regime of the IAEA is vague and ineffective.
Staff members who protested signing the proposed Confidentiality Undertak-
ing are confused and uncertain about what the terms of the Agency's breach
policy are.' To have an effective policy in which both staff members and
state members can have confidence, this confusion needs to be alleviated. The
Agency needs a clear procedure to be taken in the case of unauthorized
disclosures.
The Agency's current regime also lacks a detailed procedure on classifying
confidential materials.' If a staff member is unclear whether a particular
document is confidential, then protection of that document is made particularly
difficult. 5 A staff member cannot take action to protect against disclosure if
he does not believe the information to be confidential. The Agency should
make this judgment in a uniform and consistent manner instead of leaving it
up to individual inspectors.
Finally, because of these two major weaknesses in the Agency's policy on
confidentiality, the IAEA has left nuclear facility and weapons inspections
181 See SCHEINMAN, supra note 2, at 72.
1S2 See Johnson, supra note 116.
13 See Obligations to Protect Confidential Information, Addendum 1, supra note 131, para.
3(a) (noting staff members concerns about their liability under the terms of the Confidentiality
Undertaking).
' See id. para. 3(b) (citing staff members' concerns about a lack of an adequate confidential
information classification system); see also id. para. 1 (the fifth paragraph, incorrectly labeled
number 1) (addressing the need to review the Agency's current classification policies).
'85 Arguably, Provisional Staff Regulation 1.06 provides all of the guidance necessary in that
it defines staff members' obligations to protect "any information known to them by reason of
their official position which has not been madepublic ... " Id. para. 3 (referring to Provisional
Staff Regulation 1.06) (emphasis added). Therefore, any information gained as aresult of a staff
member's official duties is confidential so long as it has not been made public by the Agency.
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vulnerable to negative press and political subversion.8 6 A lack of confidence
in the IAEA practices will lead to less cooperation by member states as well
as an overAll decrease in the Agency's productivity and effectiveness.'87
Therefore, immediate actions, whether consistent with the suggestions made
above or of a different nature, need to be undertaken in order to preserve the
Agency's most powerful tool-nuclear facility inspections.
'"See NBCNightly News: Spy Story (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 7, 1999); see supra Part
II.
m This decrease in effectiveness is exhibited in Iraq's continued refusal to cooperate with
IAEA and UNSCOM inspection procedures as well as repeated allegations of espionage within
the international organizations that require weapons inspections. See supra Part II.
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